Bank Runs, Fragility, and Credit Easing

Manuel Amador [1] Javier Bianchi[2]

[1]Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis University of Minnesota
[2]Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis

Motivation

- Financial crises typically involve bank runs
- Short-term debt can make a bank vulnerable to a self-fulfilling run
- Empirically, runs more likely with weak aggregate fundamentals
  - General equilibrium feedbacks potentially important

★ Macroeconomic model essential to understand feedbacks

Q: What are the implications for government policy?

A Macroeconomic Model of Bank Runs

- Dynamic portfolio and equity decisions for banks
  - Depend on asset prices, determined in equilibrium
- Limited commitment and endogenous strategic default
  - Defaults triggered by fundamentals or runs
- Fragility linked to fundamentals, as in Gertler-Kiyotaki model, but and Maturity critical for fragility
  - Runs on individual banks
  - Maturity critical for fragility
- Normative analysis

Preview of Main Normative Results

- Desirability of **credit easing** depends on source of the crisis

  - Welfare *reducing* if driven by fundamentals, but welfare *improving* if driven by runs

- Repaying banks are **net sellers** in a crisis driven by runs

  $\Rightarrow$ Benefit from increase in asset prices

...but are net buyers if a crisis is driven by fundamentals

$\Rightarrow$ Lose from increase in asset prices

Outline of the Talk

1. Environment without runs

2. Model with bank runs

3. Policy analysis

Environment

- Discrete time, infinite horizon, no aggregate risk
- Continuum of banks, preferences $\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \log(c_t)$.
- Creditors have linear utility, discount rate R
- Technology
  - Production of consumption good: $y = zk$
  - Capital in fixed supply $\overline{K}$
- Competitive market for assets and deposits

Banks' Budget Constraints

All banks start at $t = 0$ with portfolio $(b_0, \overline{K})$

- If repay at time t:

$$c = (\bar{z} + p_t)k - Rb + q_t(b', k')b' - p_t k'.$$

  - q_t price schedule of deposits
  - p_t price of capital

- Deposits are one-period non-state contingent claims
  - Without loss for now, but will matter with runs

Banks' Budget Constraints

- If default at time t:

$$c = (\underline{z} + p_t)k - p_t k'$$

- Permanent financial exclusion $b' = 0$
  - Restriction on saving w/o loss
- Productivity loss $y = \underline{z}k$
  - Evidence on losses of firms exposed to defaulting banks

Strategic Bank Default

$$
\begin{aligned}
V_t^R(b,k) &= \max_{k',b',c} \log(c) + \beta V_{t+1}(b',k') \\
&\quad \text{s.t.} \quad c = (\bar{z} + p_t)k - Rb + q_t(b',k')b' - p_t k' \\
&\quad \phantom{\text{s.t.}} \quad \text{No-Ponzi}
\end{aligned}
$$

$$
\begin{aligned}
V_t^D(k) &= \max_{k',c} \log(c) + \beta V_{t+1}^D(k') \\
&\quad \text{s.t.} \quad c = \underline{z}k + p_t(k - k')
\end{aligned}
$$

Strategic Bank Default

$$
\begin{aligned}
V_t^R(b,k) &= \max_{k',b',c} \log(c) + \beta V_{t+1}(b',k') \\
&\quad \text{s.t.} \quad c = (\bar{z} + p_t)k - Rb + q_t(b',k')b' - p_t k' \\
&\quad \phantom{\text{s.t.}} \quad \text{No-Ponzi}
\end{aligned}
$$

$$
\begin{aligned}
V_t^D(k) &= \max_{k',c} \log(c) + \beta V_{t+1}^D(k') \\
&\quad \text{s.t.} \quad c = \underline{z}k + p_t(k - k')
\end{aligned}
$$

Repayment decision:

- If $V_t^R(b,k) > V_t^D(k)$: repay

Strategic Bank Default

$$
\begin{aligned}
V_t^R(b,k) \quad = \quad & \max_{k',b',c} \; \log(c) + \beta V_{t+1}(b',k') \\
& \text{s.t.} \quad c = (\bar{z} + p_t)k - Rb + q_t(b',k')b' - p_t k' \\
& \qquad\;\; \text{No-Ponzi}
\end{aligned}
$$

$$
\begin{aligned}
V_t^D(k) \quad = \quad & \max_{k',c} \; \log(c) + \beta V_{t+1}^D(k') \\
& \text{s.t.} \quad c = \underline{z}k + p_t(k - k')
\end{aligned}
$$

Repayment decision:

- If $V_t^R(b,k) < V_t^D(k)$: default

Strategic Bank Default

$$
\begin{aligned}
V_t^R(b,k) \quad &= \quad \max_{k',b',c} \ \log(c) + \beta V_{t+1}(b',k') \\
& \qquad \text{s.t.} \quad c = (\bar{z} + p_t)k - Rb + q_t(b',k')b' - p_t k' \\
& \qquad \qquad \ \ \text{No-Ponzi}
\end{aligned}
$$

$$
\begin{aligned}
V_t^D(k) \quad &= \quad \max_{k',c} \ \log(c) + \beta V_{t+1}^D(k') \\
& \qquad \text{s.t.} \quad c = \underline{z}k + p_t(k - k')
\end{aligned}
$$

Repayment decision:

- If $V_t^R(b,k) = V_t^D(k)$: indifferent

Strategic Bank Default

$$
\begin{aligned}
V_t^R(b,k) \quad &= \quad \max_{k',b',c} \ \log(c) + \beta V_{t+1}(b',k') \\
&\text{s.t.} \quad c = (\bar{z} + p_t)k - Rb + q_t(b',k')b' - p_t k' \\
&\qquad\quad \text{No-Ponzi}
\end{aligned}
$$

$$
\begin{aligned}
V_t^D(k) \quad &= \quad \max_{k',c} \ \log(c) + \beta V_{t+1}^D(k') \\
&\text{s.t.} \quad c = \underline{z}k + p_t(k - k')
\end{aligned}
$$

Repayment decision:

- If $V_t^R(b,k) = V_t^D(k)$: indifferent
  - Repay for $t > 0$
  - **Default with probability** ϕ **for** $t = 0$

Equilibrium Consistent Borrowing Limit

- Equilibrium default only at $t = 0$

Equilibrium Consistent Borrowing Limit

- Equilibrium default only at $t = 0$
- Bank at time t faces $q_t = 1$ if

$$V^R_{t+1}(b', k') \geq V^D_{t+1}(k')$$

Otherwise, $q = 0$.

Equilibrium Consistent Borrowing Limit

- Equilibrium default only at $t = 0$

- Bank at time t faces $q_t = 1$ if

$$V^R_{t+1}(b', k') \geq V^D_{t+1}(k')$$

  Otherwise, $q = 0$.

- Guess and verify borrowing constraint

$$b_{t+1} \leq \gamma_t p_{t+1} k_{t+1}$$

  where $\{\gamma_t\}$ is an eqm. object to be determined

The Value of Default

$$V_t^D(k) = A + \frac{1}{1-\beta}\log(k(\underline{z} + p_t)) + \frac{\beta}{1-\beta}\sum_{\tau \geq t}\beta^{\tau - t}\log\left(R_{\tau+1}^D\right),$$

where the return on capital under default

$$R_{t+1}^D = \frac{\underline{z} + p_{t+1}}{p_t}$$

and $A \equiv \frac{1}{1-\beta}\left[\log(1-\beta) + \frac{\beta}{1-\beta}\log(\beta)\right]$

The Value of Default

$$V_t^D(k) = A + \frac{1}{1-\beta}\log(k(\underline{z} + p_t)) + \frac{\beta}{1-\beta}\sum_{\tau \geq t} \beta^{\tau - t}\log\left(R_{\tau+1}^D\right),$$

where the return on capital under default

$$R_{t+1}^D = \frac{\underline{z} + p_{t+1}}{p_t}$$

and $A \equiv \frac{1}{1-\beta}\left[\log(1-\beta) + \frac{\beta}{1-\beta}\log(\beta)\right]$

Policies:

$$\mathcal{C}_t^D(k) = (1-\beta)\left(\underline{z} + p_t\right)k, \qquad \mathcal{K}_{t+1}^D(k) = \beta\frac{(\underline{z} + p_t)k}{p_t}$$

The Value of Repayment

Denote $n = k(\bar{z} + p) - bR$

$$V_t^R(n) = A + \frac{1}{1-\beta}\log(n) + \frac{\beta}{1-\beta}\sum_{\tau \geq t}^{\infty} \beta^{\tau - t}\log(R^e_{\tau+1}),$$

where returns are

$$R^e_{t+1} = R^k_{t+1} + (R^k_{t+1} - R)\frac{\gamma_t p_{t+1}}{p_t - \gamma_t p_{t+1}} \quad R^k_{t+1} \equiv \frac{\bar{z} + p_{t+1}}{p_t},$$

Policies:

$$\mathcal{C}_t^R(n) = (1-\beta)n$$

$$\mathcal{B}^R_{t+1}(n) = \gamma_t p_{t+1}\mathcal{K}^R_{t+1}(n), \qquad \mathcal{K}^R_{t+1}(n) = \frac{\beta n}{p_t - \gamma_t p_{t+1}} \quad \text{if } R^k_{t+1} > R$$

Equilibrium Consistent Borrowing Limit

- Given a sequence of prices, a bank is indifferent between repaying and defaulting at $t+1$ if

$$\frac{\bar{z} + p_{t+1}(1 - \gamma_t R)}{\underline{z} + p_{t+1}} = \left(1 - \gamma_{t+1} \frac{p_{t+2}}{p_{t+1}}\right)^{\beta}$$

Equilibrium Consistent Borrowing Limit

- Given a sequence of prices, a bank is indifferent between repaying and defaulting at $t+1$ if

$$\frac{\bar{z} + p_{t+1}(1 - \gamma_t R)}{\underline{z} + p_{t+1}} = \left(1 - \gamma_{t+1} \frac{p_{t+2}}{p_{t+1}}\right)^{\beta}$$

- Potentially many solutions, but <u>only one</u> consistent with No-Ponzi

Solving for γ_t for Constant Price

$$\gamma_{t+1} = 1 - \left(\frac{R^k(p)/R - \gamma_t}{R^D(p)/R} \right)^{\frac{1}{\beta}} \equiv H(\gamma_t)$$

Solving for γ_t for Constant Price

$$\gamma_{t+1} = 1 - \left(\frac{R^k(p)/R - \gamma_t}{R^D(p)/R} \right)^{\frac{1}{\beta}} \equiv H(\gamma_t)$$

- Partial eqm. does not exist if return on capital is too high
  - No borrowing limit

(b) No fixed point



Solving for γ_t for Constant Price

$$\gamma_{t+1} = 1 - \left(\frac{R^k(p)/R - \gamma_t}{R^D(p)/R} \right)^{\frac{1}{\beta}} \equiv H(\gamma_t)$$

- If eqm $\exists$, two fixed points but only smallest satisfies No-Ponzi
  - First fixed point unstable $\Rightarrow \gamma_t = \gamma^\star$
  - $\gamma^\star$ is increasing in $(\beta, \bar{z})$ and decreasing in $(R, \underline{z}, p)$



General Equilibrium

- Market clearing for capital

$$\phi K_t^D + (1 - \phi) K_t^R = \overline{K}$$

where $\phi \in [0, 1]$ are the banks that default at $t = 0$

General Equilibrium

- Market clearing for capital

$$\phi K_t^D + (1-\phi)K_t^R = \overline{K}$$

where $\phi \in [0,1]$ are the banks that default at $t=0$

- To be consistent with repayment decisions:

$$\phi = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } B_0 > \gamma_{-1} p_0 \overline{K}, \\ 0 & \text{if } B_0 < \gamma_{-1} p_0 \overline{K}, \\ \in [0,1] & \text{if } B_0 = \gamma_{-1} p_0 \overline{K} \end{cases}$$

where

$$\frac{\bar{z} + p_0(1-\gamma_{-1}R)}{\underline{z} + p_0} = \left(1 - \gamma_0 \frac{p_1}{p_0}\right)^{\beta}$$

Definition of Equilibrium

Given B_0, an equilibrium is a sequence of $\{p_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}, \{\gamma_t\}_{t=-1}^{\infty}$, aggregate debt and capital, $\{B_t, K_t^R, K_t^D\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$, and an *initial share of defaulting banks*, ϕ, such that

(i) Evolution of aggregate B, K consistent with bank optimality

$$B_{t+1} = \mathcal{B}_{t+1}((\bar{z} + p_t)K_t^R - RB_t)$$

$$K_{t+1}^R = \mathcal{K}_{t+1}^R((\bar{z} + p_t)K_t^R - RB_t)$$

$$K_{t+1}^D = \mathcal{K}_{t+1}^D((\underline{z} + p_t)K_t^D)$$

(ii) Borrowing limits are equilibrium consistent

(iii) Market for capital clears

(iv) ϕ is consistent with banks' optimal default decision

General Equilibrium

Type of equilibrium depends on B_0

Stationary values:

$$p^R = \frac{\beta \bar{z}}{1 - \beta - (1 - \beta R)\gamma^R} \qquad p^D = \frac{\beta}{1-\beta}\underline{z}$$

$$\gamma^R = H(\gamma^R, p^R) \qquad \gamma^D = H(\gamma^D, p^D)$$

General Equilibrium

Type of equilibrium depends on B_0

Repayment eqm. | Mixed eqm. | Default eqm

$\gamma^R p^R \overline{K}$ $\quad$ $\gamma^D p^D \overline{K}$ $\quad \longrightarrow B_0$

Stationary values:

$$p^R = \frac{\beta \bar{z}}{1-\beta-(1-\beta R)\gamma^R} \qquad p^D = \frac{\beta}{1-\beta}\underline{z}$$

$$\gamma^R = H(\gamma^R, p^R) \qquad \gamma^D = H(\gamma^D, p^D)$$

General Equilibrium

Type of equilibrium depends on B_0

Repayment eqm. | Mixed eqm. | Default eqm $\rightarrow B_0$

$\gamma^R p^R \overline{K}$ $\qquad$ $\gamma^D p^D \overline{K}$

Stationary values:

$$p^R = \frac{\beta \bar{z}}{1 - \beta - (1 - \beta R)\gamma^R} \qquad p^D = \frac{\beta}{1-\beta}\underline{z}$$

$$\gamma^R = H(\gamma^R, p^R) \qquad \gamma^D = H(\gamma^D, p^D)$$

General Equilibrium

Type of equilibrium depends on B_0

Stationary values:

$$p^R = \frac{\beta \bar{z}}{1 - \beta - (1 - \beta R)\gamma^R} \qquad p^D = \frac{\beta}{1-\beta}\underline{z}$$

$$\gamma^R = H(\gamma^R, p^R) \qquad \gamma^D = H(\gamma^D, p^D)$$

Type of equilibrium depends on B_0

Stationary values:

$$p^R = \frac{\beta \bar{z}}{1 - \beta - (1 - \beta R)\gamma^R} \qquad\qquad p^D = \frac{\beta}{1 - \beta}\underline{z}$$

$$\gamma^R = H(\gamma^R, p^R) \qquad\qquad \gamma^D = H(\gamma^D, p^D)$$

Result: $\gamma^D p^D > \gamma^R p^R \rightarrow$ Uniqueness

General Equilibrium

Type of equilibrium depends on B_0



Within thresholds, a degenerate equilibrium does not exist

- Fraction ϕ defaults and $1 - \phi$ repay
    - Generalize Kehoe-Levine, by allowing initial defaults

General Equilibrium

Type of equilibrium depends on B_0



Within thresholds, a degenerate equilibrium does not exist

- Fraction ϕ defaults and $1 - \phi$ repay
  - Generalize Kehoe-Levine, by allowing initial defaults

In the paper: ▸ Details

- Unique stationary eqm. and unique transition
- Repaying banks are net buyers of k in the mixed eqm.

Equilibrium ϕ and p_0 as a function of B_0

Defaulting banks ϕ



Price of Capital p_0



Mixed Equilibrium Simulations

Price of Capital p_t



Leverage Threshold γ_t



Capital Holdings



Outline of the Talk

1. Environment without runs

2. Model with bank runs

3. Policy analysis

Self-Fulfilling Bank Runs

Coordination problem between creditors a la Cole-Kehoe

- Creditors may refuse to rollover $\Rightarrow$ repayment more costly
- If optimal to default during a run, a bank is "vulnerable"

Multiplicity of Equilibria

- Bank facing a run needs to de-lever:

$$\hat{V}_t^{Run}(n) = \max_{k' \geq 0, c} \log(c) + V_{t+1}\left((\bar{z} + p_{t+1})k'\right)$$

$$s.t \quad c = n + \overset{0}{\cancel{b'}} - p_t k'$$

- Safe bank faces tighter constraint:

$$\hat{V}_t^{Safe}(n) = \max_{b', k' \geq 0, c} \log(c) + \beta \hat{V}_{t+1}^{Safe}((\bar{z} + p_{t+1})k' - Rb')$$

$$s.t \quad c = n + b' - p_t k'$$

$$\hat{V}_{t+1}^{Run}(n') \geq V_{t+1}^{D}(k') \qquad \text{[If vulnerable, run happens]}$$

Multiplicity of Equilibria

- Bank facing a run needs to de-lever:

$$\hat{V}_t^{Run}(n) = \max_{k' \geq 0, c} \log(c) + V_{t+1}\left((\bar{z} + p_{t+1})k'\ \right)$$

$$s.t \quad c = n + \cancel{b'}^{\,0} - p_t k'$$

- Safe bank faces tighter constraint:

$$\hat{V}_t^{Safe}(n) = \max_{b', k' \geq 0, c} \log(c) + \beta \hat{V}_{t+1}^{Safe}((\bar{z} + p_{t+1})k' - Rb')$$

$$s.t \quad c = n + b' - p_t k'$$

$$\hat{V}_{t+1}^{Run}(n') \geq V_{t+1}^{D}(k') \qquad \text{[If vulnerable, run happens]}$$

Multiplicity of Equilibria

- Bank facing a run needs to de-lever:

$$\hat{V}_t^{Run}(n) = \max_{k' \geq 0, c} \log(c) + V_{t+1}\left((\bar{z} + p_{t+1})k'\right)$$

$$s.t \quad c = n + \cancelto{0}{b'} - p_t k'$$

- Safe bank faces tighter constraint:

$$\hat{V}_t^{Safe}(n) = \max_{b', k' \geq 0, c} \log(c) + \beta \hat{V}_{t+1}^{Safe}((\bar{z} + p_{t+1})k' - Rb')$$

$$s.t \quad c = n + b' - p_t k'$$

$$\hat{V}_{t+1}^{Run}(n') \geq V_{t+1}^D(k') \qquad \text{[If vulnerable, run happens]}$$

- $\hat{V}_t^{Run}(n) > V_t^D(k)$: bank is safe (run does not happen)

Multiplicity of Equilibria

- Bank facing a run needs to de-lever:

$$\hat{V}_t^{Run}(n) = \max_{k' \geq 0, c} \log(c) + V_{t+1}\left((\bar{z} + p_{t+1})k'\right)$$

$$s.t \quad c = n + \cancelto{0}{b'} - p_t k'$$

- Safe bank faces tighter constraint:

$$\hat{V}_t^{Safe}(n) = \max_{b', k' \geq 0, c} \log(c) + \beta \hat{V}_{t+1}^{Safe}((\bar{z} + p_{t+1})k' - Rb')$$

$$s.t \quad c = n + b' - p_t k'$$

$$\hat{V}_{t+1}^{Run}(n') \geq V_{t+1}^{D}(k') \qquad \text{[If vulnerable, run happens]}$$

- $\hat{V}_t^{Safe}(n) < V_t^D(k)$: bank defaults (for fundamentals)

Multiplicity of Equilibria

- Bank facing a run needs to de-lever:

$$\hat{V}_t^{Run}(n) = \max_{k' \geq 0, c} \log(c) + V_{t+1}\left((\bar{z} + p_{t+1})k'\right)$$

$$s.t \quad c = n + \cancel{b'}^{\,0} - p_t k'$$

- Safe bank faces tighter constraint:

$$\hat{V}_t^{Safe}(n) = \max_{b', k' \geq 0, c} \log(c) + \beta \hat{V}_{t+1}^{Safe}((\bar{z} + p_{t+1})k' - Rb')$$

$$s.t \quad c = n + b' - p_t k'$$

$$\hat{V}_{t+1}^{Run}(n') \geq V_{t+1}^{D}(k') \qquad \text{[If vulnerable, run happens]}$$

- $\hat{V}_t^{Run}(n) < V_t^D(k) < \hat{V}_t^{Safe}(n)$: bank is vulnerable (eqm. indet.)

The Effects of Bank Runs

- Financial fragility, default region expands $\downarrow \gamma^D$
  - Repayment region contracts $\gamma^R \downarrow$ if and only if $\beta R < 1$

The Effects of Bank Runs

- Financial fragility, default region expands $\downarrow \gamma^D$
    - Repayment region contracts $\gamma^R \downarrow$ if and only if $\beta R < 1$



The Effects of Bank Runs

- Financial fragility, default region expands $\downarrow \gamma^D$
  - Repayment region contracts $\gamma^R \downarrow$ if and only if $\beta R < 1$



- Lower price of capital
  - Lower γ, implies lower demand by repaying banks
  - More defaulting banks, which have lower demand for capital

Outline of the Talk

1. Basic environment without bank runs
    - Bank problem in partial equilibrium
    - General equilibrium
2. Introduce bank runs
3. Policy analysis

Credit Easing

- Government purchases assets K^g at $t = 0$

$$\phi K_t^D + (1 - \phi) K_t^R + K^g = \overline{K}$$

Credit Easing

- Government purchases assets K^g at $t = 0$

$$\phi K_t^D + (1 - \phi) K_t^R + K^g = \overline{K}$$

- Govt. budget constraints at $t = 0, 1$

$$p_0 K^g = T_0 + B_1^g, \qquad RB_1^g = (z^g + p_1) K^g$$

Credit Easing

- Government purchases assets K^g at $t = 0$

$$\phi K_t^D + (1-\phi) K_t^R + K^g = \overline{K}$$

- Assume that govt. return $R^g = \frac{p_1 + z^g}{p_0} < R$:

$$T_0 = \frac{p_0 K^g}{R} [R - R^g] > 0,$$

$\Rightarrow$ Investors don't want to buy k (if same return as gov.)

Credit Easing

- Government purchases assets K^g at $t = 0$

$$\phi K_t^D + (1-\phi) K_t^R + K^g = \overline{K}$$

- Assume that govt. return $R^g = \frac{p_1 + z^g}{p_0} < R$:

$$T_0 = \frac{p_0 K^g}{R} [R - R^g] > 0,$$

$\Rightarrow$ Investors don't want to buy k (if same return as gov.)

Q: How does credit easing affect ϕ and welfare?

Welfare Effects of Credit Easing

$$W(K^g) = \phi V^D(K^g) + (1-\phi)V^R(K^g)$$

Welfare Effects of Credit Easing

$$\frac{dW}{dK^g} = \left[\phi \frac{dV^D}{dK^g} + (1-\phi)\frac{dV^R}{dK^g}\right] + \left(V^D - V^R\right) \frac{d\phi}{dK^g}$$

Welfare Effects of Credit Easing

Assume $\phi = 0$

$$\frac{dW}{dK^g} = \left[\qquad\qquad\qquad\qquad \frac{dV^R}{dK^g} \right] + \underbrace{\left(V^D - V^R\right)\frac{d\phi}{dK^g}}_{\leq 0}$$

Welfare Effects of Credit Easing

Assume $\phi = 0$

$$\frac{dW}{dK^g} = \left[\qquad\qquad\qquad\qquad \frac{dV^R}{dK^g} \right] + \underbrace{\left(V^D - V^R\right)\frac{d\phi}{dK^g}}_{\leq 0}$$

Effects of K^g via (T_0, p_0) and $\{p_t, \gamma_t(p_t)\}_{t\geq 1}$

$$\frac{dV^R}{dK^g} = u'(c_R)\left[(\overline{K} - k_1^R)\frac{dp_0}{dK^g} - \frac{dT_0}{dK^g}\right] + \left[u'(c_R) - \beta R \hat{V}_1^{R\prime}(n_1^R)\right] k_1^R \frac{d\gamma_0 p_1}{dK^g}$$

$$+ \beta \left.\frac{d\hat{V}_1^R(n)}{dK^g}\right|_{n=n_1^R} + \beta \hat{V}_1^{R\prime}(n_1^R) k_1^R \frac{dp_1}{dK^g}$$

Welfare Effects of Credit Easing

Assume $\phi = 0$

$$\frac{dW}{dK^g} = \left[\qquad\qquad\qquad\qquad \frac{dV^R}{dK^g} \right] + \underbrace{\left(V^D - V^R\right) \frac{d\phi}{dK^g}}_{\leq 0}$$

Effects of K^g via (T_0, p_0) and $\{p_t, \gamma_t(p_t)\}_{t\geq 1}$

$$\frac{dV^R}{dK^g} = u'(c_R) \left[(\overline{K} - k_1^R) \frac{dp_0}{dK^g} - \frac{dT_0}{dK^g} \right] + \left[u'(c_R) - \beta R \hat{V}_1^{R\prime}(n_1^R) \right] k_1^R \frac{d\gamma_0 p_1}{dK^g}$$

$$+ \beta \left. \frac{d\hat{V}_1^R(n)}{dK^g} \right|_{n=n_1^R} + \beta \hat{V}_1^{R\prime}(n_1^R) k_1^R \frac{dp_1}{dK^g}$$

$$\frac{dV^R}{dK^g} = u'(c_R) p_0 \left(\frac{R^g - R}{R} \right) < 0 \qquad \text{[Ignoring effects on future prices]}$$

Welfare effects of Credit Easing $\phi > 0$

$$\frac{dW}{dK_g} = \left[\phi \frac{dV^D}{dK_g} - (1-\phi)\frac{dV^R}{dK_g}\right] - \left(V^R - V^D\right)\frac{d\phi}{dK_g}$$

Welfare effects of Credit Easing $\phi > 0$

$$\frac{dW}{dK_g} = \left[\phi \frac{dV^D}{dK_g} - (1-\phi)\frac{dV^R}{dK_g}\right] - \cancelto{0}{\left(V^R - V^D\right)} \frac{d\phi}{dK_g}$$

Without runs:

- $V^R = V^D \;\Rightarrow\; d\phi$ irrelevant

Welfare effects of Credit Easing $\phi > 0$

$$\frac{dW}{dK_g} = \left[\phi \frac{dV^D}{dK_g} - (1-\phi)\frac{dV^R}{dK_g}\right] - \underbrace{\cancel{\left(V^R - V^D\right)\frac{d\phi}{dK_g}}}_{\to 0}$$

Without runs:

- $V^R = V^D \;\Rightarrow\; d\phi$ irrelevant
- Given $\{p_1, p_2 ...\}$, $dV^R = dV^D = dW < 0$

Welfare effects of Credit Easing $\phi > 0$

$$\frac{dW}{dK_g} = \left[\phi \frac{dV^D}{dK_g} - (1-\phi)\frac{dV^R}{dK_g}\right] - \left(V^R - V^D\right)\frac{d\phi}{dK_g}$$

0

Without runs:

- $V^R = V^D \;\Rightarrow\; d\phi$ irrelevant
- Given $\{p_1, p_2 ...\}$, $dV^R = dV^D = dW < 0$

With runs:

- $V^R = V^{Safe} > V^{Run} = V^D$

$\Rightarrow$ If $d\phi < 0$, possibility that $\Uparrow W$

A repaying banks facing a run is a net seller of assets

$\Rightarrow$ benefits from intervention that $\Uparrow p_0 \Rightarrow d\phi < 0$

Welfare effects of Credit Easing $\phi > 0$

$$\frac{dW}{dK_g} = \left[\phi \frac{dV^D}{dK_g} - (1-\phi)\frac{dV^R}{dK_g}\right] - \left(V^R - V^D\right)\frac{d\phi}{dK_g}$$

Without runs:

- $V^R = V^D \;\Rightarrow\; d\phi$ irrelevant
- Given $\{p_1, p_2 ...\}$, $dV^R = dV^D = dW < 0$

With runs:

- $V^R = V^{Safe} > V^{Run} = V^D$

$\Rightarrow$ If $d\phi < 0$, possibility that $\Uparrow W$

A repaying banks facing a run is a net seller of assets

$\Rightarrow$ benefits from intervention that $\Uparrow p_0 \Rightarrow d\phi < 0$

Credit Easing: Self-Fulfilling vs. Fundamentals

Self-Fulfilling Runs

p_0



ϕ



Fundamentals

p_0



ϕ



Credit Easing: Self-Fulfilling vs. Fundamentals

Self-Fulfilling Runs

p_0



ϕ



Fundamentals

p_0



ϕ



Other Policies

- Controlling default decisions: ▸ Details
    - Banks prefer higher ϕ without runs and lower ϕ with runs
- Tax on purchases of capital at $t = 0$ rebated lump sum
    - Irrelevant: after-tax price remains constant and has no effects
- Deposit insurance: deters runs, but requires borrowing limits
- Lender of last resort: must cover *all* banks to be effective

Conclusions

- A dynamic macroeconomic model of self-fulfilling bank runs
- General equilibrium effects crucial to assess govt. policies
- Desirability of credit easing depends on whether a crisis is diriven by fundamentals or self-fulfilling runs
- Agenda:
  - Anticipation effects of credit easing
  - Use framework for other policies, such as macroprudential

Government picks ϕ at $t = 0$

Banks' welfare

$$W = (1 - \phi)V^R + \phi V^D$$

Government picks ϕ at $t = 0$

Banks' welfare

$$W = (1 - \phi)V^R + \phi V^D$$

- *Assume only p_0 changes in response to policy:*

$$\left.\frac{dW}{d\phi}\right|_{\phi=\phi^E} = (V^D(p_0^E) - V^R(p_0^E)) + \left[(1-\phi)\left.\frac{dV^R(p_0)}{dp_0}\right|_{p_0=p_0^E} + \phi \left.\frac{dV^D(p_0)}{dp_0}\right|_{p_0=p_0^E}\right]\frac{dp_0}{d\phi}$$

Government picks ϕ at $t = 0$

Banks' welfare

$$W = (1-\phi)V^R + \phi V^D$$

- *Assume only p_0 changes in response to policy:*

$$\left.\frac{dW}{d\phi}\right|_{\phi=\phi^E} = (V^D(p_0^E) - V^R(p_0^E)) + \left[(1-\phi)\left.\frac{dV^R(p_0)}{dp_0}\right|_{p_0=p_0^E} + \phi \left.\frac{dV^D(p_0)}{dp_0}\right|_{p_0=p_0^E}\right]\frac{dp_0}{d\phi}$$

Government picks ϕ at $t = 0$

Banks' welfare

$$W = (1-\phi)V^R + \phi V^D$$

- *Assume only p_0 changes in response to policy:*

$$\left.\frac{dW}{d\phi}\right|_{\phi=\phi^E} = (V^D(p_0^E) - V^R(p_0^E)) + \left[(1-\phi)\left.\frac{dV^R(p_0)}{dp_0}\right|_{p_0=p_0^E} + \phi \left.\frac{dV^D(p_0)}{dp_0}\right|_{p_0=p_0^E}\right]\frac{dp_0}{d\phi}$$

$$\left.\frac{dV^R(p_0)}{dp_0}\right|_{\phi=\phi^E} = u'(c^R)(\overline{K}-k^R(p_0^E)), \quad \left.\frac{dV^D(p_0)}{dp_0}\right|_{\phi=\phi^E} = u'(c^D)(\overline{K}-k^D(p_0^E)).$$

Government picks ϕ at $t = 0$

Banks' welfare

$$W = (1-\phi)V^R + \phi V^D$$

- *Assume only p_0 changes in response to policy:*

$$\left.\frac{dW}{d\phi}\right|_{\phi=\phi^E} = [V^D(p_0^E) - V^R(p_0^E)]$$

$$- \ (1-\phi)[\overbrace{u'(c^R(p_0^E)) - u'(c^D(p_0^E))}^{>0}]\overbrace{(k^R(p_0^E) - \bar{K})}^{>0}\overbrace{\frac{dp_0}{d\phi}}^{<0}$$

$\uparrow \phi$ reduces p_0 and helps repaying banks that have high u'

Government picks ϕ at $t = 0$

Banks' welfare

$$W = (1-\phi)V^R + \phi V^D$$

- *Assume only p_0 changes in response to policy:*

$$\left.\frac{dW}{d\phi}\right|_{\phi=\phi^E} = \cancelto{0}{[V^D(p_0^E) - V^R(p_0^E)]}$$

$$- \ (1-\phi)\overbrace{[u'(c^R(p_0^E)) - u'(c^D(p_0^E))]}^{>0}\overbrace{(k^R(p_0^E) - \bar{K})}^{>0}\overbrace{\frac{dp_0}{d\phi}}^{<0}$$

$\uparrow \phi$ reduces p_0 and helps repaying banks that have high u'

- Without runs: optimal to have more banks defaulting

Government picks ϕ at $t = 0$

Banks' welfare

$$W = (1-\phi)V^R + \phi V^D$$

- *Assume only p_0 changes in response to policy:*

$$\left.\frac{dW}{d\phi}\right|_{\phi=\phi^E} = [V^D(p_0^E) - V^R(p_0^E)]$$

$$- \ (1-\phi)[\overbrace{u'(c^R(p_0^E)) - u'(c^D(p_0^E))}^{>0}]\overbrace{(k^R(p_0^E) - \bar{K})}^{>0}\overbrace{\frac{dp_0}{d\phi}}^{<0}$$

$\uparrow \phi$ reduces p_0 and helps repaying banks that have high u'

- Without runs: optimal to have more banks defaulting
- With runs: may be optimal to reduce defaults back

Simulations: Socially Optimal Default

Back

Fundamentals

(a) Welfare



(b) p_0



(c) $\gamma_0 p_1$



Self-Fulfilling Runs

(d) Welfare



(e) p_0



(f) $\gamma_0 p_1$